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Abstract
This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little
knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not
only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The
model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma and coordination
games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at
learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy
higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one
player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others.
However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow
learners.
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1. Introduction
In standard game theory, players are assumed to have well-formed beliefs and knowl-
edge of the structure of the game they play. The origins of their beliefs and knowledge are
rarely studied. The validity of this assumption is questioned, however, in experimental
economics.1 According to Camerer (2003, p. 474), “what game do people think they
are playing?” is a top 10 most important open research question in experimental game
theory.
If players do not understand a game completely, or misunderstand it, how do they
learn about the true game? In the relevant literature, both theoretical and experimen-
tal, on learning in games, this question has been seldom addressed. The literature has
mainly addressed learning about how to play a game rather than on learning about
the game itself.2 An exception in experimental game theory is Oechssler and Schipper
(2003). They conducted a set of experiments in which subjects did not know the payoffs
of their opponent and were given incentive to learn about them in 2× 2 games. The au-
thors constructed the games which subjects perceived they were playing—the subjective
games—from the data. They found that the subjective games differed frequently from
the games that were actually being played.
Independently from the developments in experiments, Kaneko and Kline (2007, 2008)
initiated a new theory called “inductive game theory” to shed a light on how players gain
understandings of a game, and to study implications of players having only a partial
understanding of it. For example, Kaneko and Kline assume that players have little
knowledge of the game they play. By playing the game repeatedly, the players obtain
experiences and accumulate these memories. Based on the memories, they inductively
1Camerer (2003, p. 474) gives an example of a student who participated in an experiment at Caltech.
The students confused the coordination game used in the experiment with the prisoner’s dilemma game,
and “defected” continuously.
2Fudenberg and Levine (1998) provided a detailed survey of the theoretical literature of learning in
games. See, for example, Crawford (1995), Cheung and Friedman (1997), Mookherjee and Sopher (1997),
Erev and Roth (1998), and Camerer and Ho (1999) for the experimental learning literature. Arifovic
et al. (2006) is an interesting exercise that is intended to compare the various learning models in terms
of their abilities to replicate human behaviors observed in laboratory experiments.
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form their personal views about the game. Following this line, Akiyama et al. (2008)
undertakes a simulation study of a player s learning about the structure of a game.
They consider a simple one-person example, and simulate the process by which a player
experiences and accumulates memories about the game structure.
Following postulates of behavior and memories in Kaneko and Kline (2008, Section
3.2, p.1343), Akiyama et al. (2008), in the simulation, introduces two types of memories,
short-term and long-term memories as a player s cognitive ability. They study transitions
form short-term memories to long-term ones in response to the frequency of experiences
and show the difficulty of learning about the structure within practical finite time spans.
While this paper is also motivated to investigate inductive learning, our focus is rather
dynamics of players learning when setting a probabilistic behavior model as a variant
on informal theory in Kaneko and Kline (2008).
In this paper, we describe a model in which players play a normal form game repeat-
edly and learn not only about how to play the game but also about the game itself. A
normal form game consists of the set of players, the set of available actions (or strate-
gies), and the payoff function for each player. Therefore, learning about a game means
that players do not know some of these components and learn about them. As described
in this paper, we assume that a player knows about the set of actions available to him-
self and the number of opponents. However, initially the player does not know about
the set of actions available to his opponents or anyone’s payoff functions. The player
learns about them—in particular, his own payoffs associated with possible outcomes—by
playing the game repeatedly. Therefore, for the discussion presented herein, players are
learning about different aspects of a game than those that were examined in Oechssler
and Schipper (2003).
To model how players build their personal views about a game from playing it re-
peatedly, we have adopted informal theory in inductive game theory (Kaneko and Kline
(2007, 2008); Akiyama et al. (2008)), which is related with a concept in cognitive sci-
ence: The role that autobiographical memory plays in learning from everyday life events
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(Linton, 1982; Wagenaar, 1986). An autobiographical memory is a memory of frequently
repeated events. It is an abstract script so that the details, such as the date of occur-
rence, are lost; only the general facts about the events remain. To replicate such a mode
of learning about events in our model, players are assumed to have memory of two types,
short-term and long-term memory.3
Short-term memories are temporary memories of outcomes of playing the game, i.e.,
the actions chosen by players and the payoffs received by the player.4 A short-term
memory remains in the player’s mind only for a certain number of periods, and vanishes
thereafter. The outcome will be retained as a long-term memory if the same outcome is
repeated frequently enough while the short-term memories of it remain in the player’s
mind. In other words, an outcome of the game will be retained in the player’s mind
as a long-term memory if it has been recalled frequently during a specified period. A
long-term memory permanently associates, in the mind of the player, an outcome of the
game with a payoff. Once an outcome of the game is engraved in the player’s mind as
a long-term memory, it remains there forever. Then we say that the player has learned
the part of the game corresponding to it. The personal view of a player about the game
is simply the part of the game that the player has learned.
In addition to learning about the payoffs, players learn which action to choose. The
latter is modeled based on the reinforcement learning model. When a player does not
know any of the payoffs, only the realized payoffs will be used. As the player learns
some parts of the game, she starts to infer what the payoffs could have been if she had
acted differently—at least for the parts of the game she knows. Therefore, learning
about performance of actions will be based not only on the realized payoffs but also
on the forgone payoffs where possible. We have studied this model in a 3 × 3 game
that embeds both a prisoner’s dilemma and a coordination game. Through a series of
3The model of the mind’s memory system composed of short-term and long-term memory was first
proposed by James (1890) and established by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). Long-term memory is
classifiable into episodic memory and semantic memory (Tulving, 1972). Autobiographical memory is a
type of episodic memory for information related to oneself (Brewer, 1986).
4In general, the word “memory” can mean either a store of information or information itself. As
described in this paper, we mainly use “memory” in the latter sense.
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computer simulations of the model, we demonstrate what kind of personal views the
players tend to form and what kind of behavior emerges when players’ personal views
and their behavior coevolve.
Results show that, when all the players are very slow in learning about a game, they
will only have a limited understanding (a partial view) of the game. Such a limited
understanding, however, can be beneficial for them. They might enjoy higher payoffs
than in the case of full or no understanding of the game. The players enjoy high payoffs.
Therefore, their behaviors do not change. Consequently, neither do their personal views.
Therefore, their views remain partial. When one of the players is quick in learning about
a game, he can obtain a higher payoff than the other players who are slow in learning.
However, in this case, all the players, even the fast-learning player, might obtain lower
payoffs than in the case where all the players are very slow learners.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model in
detail. Results of the model simulation are summarized in Section 3. Section 4 offers an
explanation of the results, and Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. A Model of Game Learning
We consider a two-person game. The set of players is {1, 2}, and each player i ∈ {1, 2}
has a set Si of available actions. Initially, each player only knows the set of actions that
is available to him, but he does not know the action sets of the others nor the payoffs,
i.e., he does not know the game he is facing. Through playing the game repeatedly,
players not only learn which action will bring about higher payoffs5 but also form their
views of the game they are playing. Below, we first discuss how we model the formation
5Because players are repeatedly playing the game, in principle, it is possible for them to employ
repeated game strategies and be learning about performance of such strategies instead of stage game
actions. See Hanaki et al. (2005) for a model in which players are learning about which repeated game
strategies to use. In this paper, however, we do not consider such possibilities. In the situation we are
considering, players initially do not know the set of available actions for the opponents and learn about
them as they play the game. It means that a player learns about the set of repeated game strategies
available for him as he plays the game. This expansion of the strategies set is an interesting problem to
consider in itself: we therefore leave this for future research.
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of personal views by players, and the representation of such views. Once we define a
player’s personal view of the game, we formulate how the player learns which action to
choose based on the past outcomes and his view of the game.
2.1. Formation of personal views
We assume that a player has memories of two types, short-term and long-term mem-
ories, like Akiyama et al. (2008). A short-term memory is a memory of an outcome of
playing the game, i.e., the actions chosen by players and the resultant payoff received
by the players. The short-term memory remains in the player’s mind only for a certain
number of periods, and vanishes thereafter. The outcome will be retained as a long-term
memory if the same outcome is repeated frequently enough while the short-term mem-
ories of it remain in the player’s mind. Once outcomes of the game are engraved in the
player’s mind as a long-term memory, that memory remains there forever. If that occurs,
we say that the player has learned the part of the game corresponding to it.
More precisely, player i is characterized by his short-term memory length mi and
cognition threshold ki(≤ mi). The short-term memory length is the number of periods
before a short-term memory vanishes from his mind. The cognition threshold represents
the number of repetitions needed for short term memories of an outcome to be retained as
a long-term memory. Because short-term memories vanish after mi periods, an outcome
(si, sj) will be retained in i’s mind as a long-term memory if an outcome has been
recalled ki times in the mi most recent interactions. Once outcome (si, sj) is recorded as
a long-term memory, the player knows the payoff which can be received if the outcome
is realized in the future. The transformation of an outcome of the game in the mind of
a player from a short-term memory to a long-term memory in this paper plays a similar
role as in the autobiographical memory in cognitive science. Autobiographical memory
is the memory of everyday life events. As shown by Linton (1982) and Wagenaar (1986),
this memory retains a repeated event as an abstract script. That is, when keeping such
repeated events, details such as date of occurrence are lost, and only the general facts
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about the events remain. In addition, if an event is not repeated, the memory of the
event will not remain as an autobiographical memory.
We define a player’s personal view of the game based both on the objective payoff
matrix and the set of long-term memory in the player’s mind. The set of long-term
memory in the player’s mind might change over time. Therefore, the player’s personal
view of the game will also change.
Let Π be the objective payoff matrix of the game under consideration, and let Πi rep-
resent the part of the payoff matrix that corresponds to what player i receives. Namely,
in a two person game,
Πi =

pii(si1, s
j
1) . . . pi
i(si1, s
j
nj )
...
. . .
...
pii(sini , s
j
1) . . . pi
i(sini , s
j
nj )
 ,
where ni and nj are the numbers of actions in Si and Sj , respectively, and pii : Si×Sj →
R is player i’s payoff function. We assume that pii(si, sj) 6= 0 for all si ∈ Si, sj ∈ Sj , i, j ∈
{1, 2} with j 6= i because we assign a special meaning to value zero in the subjective payoff
matrix as defined below.
Let Li(t) be the matrix that represents the state of the long-term memory in the
mind of player i at period t, where each element of the matrix takes value zero or one;
Lisi,sj (t) ∈ {0, 1}. Lisi,sj (t) takes value zero when outcome
(
si, sj
)
is not in player i’s
mind as a long-term memory at period t, and it is one otherwise. We assume that,
initially, players do not know about any of the outcomes; that is, Lisi,sj (0) = 0 for all
(si, sj) ∈ Si × Sj .
The personal view of the game for player i at period t, Π˜i(t), is definable as
Π˜i(t) = Li(t) ·Πi. (1)
Therefore, Π˜isi,sj (t) is zero when player i has not learned of the outcome
(
si, sj
)
at period
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t, and it is equal to pii(si, sj) otherwise. We designate this matrix the subjective payoff
matrix for player i at period t. Now we proceed to a discussion of how players learn
which action to choose.
2.2. Learning about performance of actions
We assume that a player’s recent experiences from choosing (as well as not choosing)
an action are summarized by his “attraction” for the action. In each period, players
choose their actions based on their attractions for each action. It is through the evolution
of attractions that players learn.
Let Ais(t) denote player i’s attraction for action s ∈ Si at period t. The probability
that player i chooses action s at period t, pis(t), depends on the player’s attraction as
follows:
pis(t) =
eλ
iAis(t)∑
k∈Si e
λiAik(t)
. (2)
Parameter λi in the logistic transformation represents the extent to which actions with
higher attractions are favored in action choice. When λi = 0, all actions are equally
likely to be chosen irrespective of their attraction. As λi becomes larger, actions with
higher attractions become disproportionally more likely to be chosen. In the limiting
case where λi → ∞, the action with the highest attraction is chosen with probability
one. The logistic transformation introduced here is common in the literature on learning
in games as well as experimental game theory to model the action choices of subjects
in laboratory experiments (see, for example, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Erev and
Roth, 1998; Camerer, 2003). Other applications of such a logistic choice model include,
for example, Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), in which agents learn and choose among
various price forecasting strategies in market settings. We assume that all the actions
have the same attraction for all the players at the beginning of the game, i.e., Ais(0) = 0
for all i and s ∈ Si. Therefore, initially, all the actions are equally likely to be chosen
irrespective of λi.
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Attractions evolve as
Ais(t+ 1) =
1
hi
hi−1∑
τ=0
Ris(t− τ), (3)
where hi = min(mi, t+1).6 Ris(t) is a stimulus the player receives for action s at period
t, which depends on the outcome of the game as well as the player’s understanding of
the game in period t in the following manner:
Ris(t) =

pii(si(t), sj(t)) if s = si(t)
Π˜is,sj(t)(t) otherwise,
(4)
where si(t) represents the action chosen by player i in period t. Equation (4) states
that the stimulus player i receives for action s ∈ Si at t is the realized payoff when he
chooses s at period t, i.e., s = si(t), irrespective of the status of long-term memory in i’s
mind. If player i does not choose s at period t, the stimulus follows i’s subjective payoff
matrix. Therefore, if the payoff consequence of (s, sj(t)) is in i’s mind as a long-term
memory, then the stimulus for action s will be the forgone payoff, i.e., the payoff player
i could have obtained if he had chosen action s in period t, given the action chosen by
the opponent in that period, sj(t). Otherwise, the stimulus will be zero.
In this definition of stimulus, we are assuming that once a player understands some
of the payoffs of the game, the player can infer what the payoffs could have been if he
had acted differently for the part of the game he knows. For the parts of the game he
does not know, he cannot make such inferences.
The proposed model of learning about performance of actions builds on two models
of action learning commonly studied in the literature: learning based only on realized
payoffs (see, e.g., Erev and Roth, 1998) and learning based on both forgone and realized
payoffs (see, e.g., Camerer and Ho, 1999). The bridge between these two in our model is
the long-term memory or personal views. Indeed, when Lisi,sj (t) = 0 for all t, (s
i, sj) ∈
6hi = min(mi, t + 1) is to take care of the early periods so that the game has not been played mi
times.
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Si × Sj , players in our model learn about performance of actions based only on realized
payoffs (RL model in below). In contrast, when Lisi,sj (t) = 1 for all t, (s
i, sj) ∈ Si×Sj ,
players always learn based on both realized and forgone payoffs (FP model in below).7
It is the dynamics of long-term memory that make our model different from existing
learning models. In the next section, we describe results of computational simulation of
our model.
3. Simulation Results
Because one focus of this study is to investigate what personal views emerge from our
model, in this paper, we consider symmetric 3 × 3 games which embed two symmetric
2× 2 games.8 The two games embedded are prisoner’s dilemma and coordination game.
As players learn the game, they may see themselves facing a prisoner’s dilemma-type
situation, a coordination game-type situation, or something else. Depending on how
players understand the game, their behaviors might vary.9
Each player i ∈ {1, 2} has three available actions {si1, si2, si3}. The objective payoff
matrix Π with a parameter a ∈ (0, 0.5) is given as follows.
s21 s
2
2 s
2
3
s11 1− a, 1− a 0, 1 1, 0
s12 1, 0 a, a a, 0
s13 0, 1 0, a 1− a, 1− a
Four cells in the upper left corner correspond to a prisoner’s dilemma game and four cells
in the lower right corner are a coordination game.
7As shown by Camerer and Ho (1999), when the learning is based both on realized and forgone
payoffs, the behavior the model generates will be equivalent to that generated by fictitious play with
probabilistic action choice, where each player, knowing the whole payoff structure, chooses the best
response, although probabilistically, to the empirical frequency of choice (action) of his opponent.
83 × 3 games are the minimal symmetric games that can involve partial strategic structures where
players have choices.
9We have also considered these two 2 × 2 games separately. The results are discussed briefly in
Appendix C.
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As described in the previous section, we have assigned a special meaning to the zero in
the subjective payoff matrix, the payoff consequences of outcomes that are not retained
as long-term memories. In order not to have zero in the objective payoff matrix, we
added b = 0.01 to all the payoffs.10 b is not shown in the above payoff matrix for clarity
of exposition. The unique pure Nash equilibrium of this game is (s12, s
2
2), with payoff
(a, a).
Parameter a reflects the severity of the dilemma in the prisoner’s dilemma game as
well as the risk–payoff tradeoff in the coordination game. In the prisoner’s dilemma game
embedded here, the lower a is, the larger the aggregate loss of not choosing (s11, s
2
1) be-
comes. In the embedded coordination game, if 1/3 < a < 0.5, (s12, s
2
2) is the risk-dominant
equilibrium whereas (s13, s
2
3) is the payoff-dominant equilibrium. It is interesting to see
what kind of views players construct and what kind of behavior they learn over time
under various values of a.
In the simulation analysis described below, we first specifically examine the cases
in which all players have the same short-term memory length mi = m and the same
cognition threshold ki = k. We then proceed to cases where players have the same
short-term memory length but different cognition thresholds. Throughout the paper,
we assume that the sensitivity of action choices to the attractions are the same across
players, λi = λ for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
3.1. Case of identical short-term memory length and threshold
We first consider the case in which the short-term memory length of the players
and their cognition thresholds are identical across players. In such cases, we have four
parameters in our model: a defines the payoff matrix, m and k determine the length
of the players’ short-term memories and their cognition threshold, and λ governs the
importance of attractions in action choices. We will present results based on a particular
set of parameter values (m = 5, λ = 5.0, a = 0.25 while varying k). The dependencies of
the results on the parameter values are discussed in the appendix.
10The results remain the same if we subtract b = 0.01 from all the payoffs.
11
Long-term Memories
t=0 t=100 t=200 t=300 t=400
1        2        3
4        5        6
7        8        9
t=500 t=600 t=700 t=800 t=900
Frequencies of Realized Outcomes
0 < t ≤ 100 100 < t ≤ 200 200 < t ≤ 300 300 < t ≤ 400 400 < t ≤ 500
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
500 < t ≤ 600 600 < t ≤ 700 700 < t ≤ 800 800 < t ≤ 900 900 < t ≤ 1000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 1: Evolution of the long-term memory (top) and the corresponding frequencies of realized out-
comes (bottom) from a single simulation run. m = 5, k = 3, λ = 5.0, a = 0.25. The black cells represent
those outcomes recorded as a long-term memory.
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Figure 1 shows an outcome of a simulation run.11 The parameters are set so that
m = 5, k = 3, λ = 5.0, and a = 0.25. To portray the evolution of players’ respective
long-term memories (top panel), the outcomes that are retained as long-term memories
at a given point in time are represented by the black cells. Nine cells in the objective
payoff matrix are numbered 1–9, as shown in the status of long-term memories at t =
0. The frequencies of realization of each outcome of the game are represented by the
height of the corresponding bars in the bottom panel. In this simulation run, outcome
1 has been realized with a high frequency in earlier periods. As a result, outcome 1
became a long-term memory of the two players. Between periods 400 and 500, however,
because of a player’s deviation from playing action 1, the players learned other outcomes.
Consequently, the behaviors of the players change quite drastically in the later periods.
As the figure shows, in the later period, outcome 5, which is the Nash equilibrium of the
game, is realized with the highest frequency.
The result portrayed in Fig. 1 is merely an example of how the players’ understanding
of the game and their behaviors coevolve as players repeatedly play the game. However, it
is not the representative result. In fact, there can be many other patterns of coevolution.
Instead of enumerating all the possible results, we specifically examine averaged results12
below.
Figure 2 presents the results of simulations for a = 0.25. In each figure, the average
payoffs of the row-player over time (top),13 the average status of long-term memories at
t = 500 (bottom), and the average frequencies of realized outcomes for 500 ≤ t ≤ 1000
(middle) are shown for k = 1 (left), k = 3 (center), and k = 5 (right). Except for
the average status of the long-term memories, the outcome of the two other models of
learning, the one based only on realized payoff (RL model) and the other based on both
realized and forgone payoff (FP model) are reported. In fact, as discussed in the last
11A single simulation run consists of 1000 interactions by a pair of players. One period in the simulation
corresponds to one interaction by the pair of players.
12For each set of parameter values, we take the average of the results generated by 100 simulation
runs, while giving varying random seeds for each run.
13The average payoff of the column-player closely resembles that of the row-player.
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Figure 2: Average payoff of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized outcomes
(middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for various k. m = 5, a = 0.25, λ = 5.0.
For the average payoff, the result of our model is presented in solid black, the solid gray represents the RL
model, and the dashed gray represents the FP model. For the average status of the long-term memories,
the darker gray corresponds to the higher likelihood that the outcome is retained as a long-term memory,
which is also represented by the height of bars.
14
paragraphs of the model section above, these two additional models are two special cases
of our model. Namely, the RL model is the case in which agents never learn about the
game, i.e., Lisi,sj (t) = 0 for all t, (s
i, sj) ∈ Si × Sj . The FP model is the case in which
agents know all the payoffs from the beginning, i.e., Lisi,sj (t) = 1 for all t, (s
i, sj) ∈
Si × Sj .
In the top panel of the figure, the outcomes from the three models are shown. The
average payoff of the row-player from the RL model (“RL players”) is shown with solid
gray. That from the FP model (“FP players”) is shown with dashed gray. The result
of our model (game learning model, “GL players”) is shown in solid black. The middle
panel shows, according to the height of the bars, the frequencies with which outcomes
corresponding to cells numbered from 1 to 9 are realized. The FP in the figure stands
for the outcome of the “FP model” whereas RL stands for that of the “RL model”. In
the bottom panel, the darkness of a cell and the corresponding height of the bars show
the proportion of the simulation runs for which the outcome was recorded as a long-term
memory at t = 500.
When k = 1, one can see that the payoff received by GL players quickly converges
to those received by FP players. When k = 1, players learn all the payoffs of the game
quite quickly. As one can see in the figure, by t = 500, all the payoffs are known by the
players almost all the time.14 Once GL players learn of all the payoffs, their behaviors
become equivalent to those of FP players.15
The convergence in the average payoff is much slower in the case of k = 3. In this
case, players do not learn all the payoffs as in the k = 1 case. Players learn, however,
the outcomes 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 by t = 500 in the most simulation runs. The result shows
that such a partial understanding is sufficient for players to choose the Nash equilibrium
action with a high probability.
14In fact, when k = 1, players understand all the payoffs by period 100 in most simulations.
15It is an interesting outcome that RL players play cooperative action (action 1) more often and
receive higher average payoffs than FP players. Similar outcomes, i.e., players learn to cooperate in the
setting where no punishment mechanism or explicit communication exists between agents, is reported
by Waltman and Kaymak (2008) for repeated Cournot oligopoly games in which agents learn based on
Q-learning, which is a reinforcement learning model used in the field of artificial intelligence.
15
Do partial understandings of the game always lead players to choose the Nash equi-
librium action with a higher likelihood? The results from the k = 5 case shows that
the answer is no. When k = 5, GL players receive higher payoffs than both RL and FP
players. The partial understandings of the game that caused this case give more benefits
to players than full or no understanding of the game. The figure shows that players learn
outcome 1, which Pareto dominates Nash equilibrium outcome 5, in most simulation
runs. Although outcomes 5 and 9 are also learned, such cases are infrequent.
The result arises from both a partial view of the game and the players’ limited ability
to acquire the view. As described in Section 2, it is hard for GL players with high
cognition thresholds k to retain the outcomes as a long-term memory. Outcome 1 realized
by these players is stable once it becomes a long-term memory because it is hard for player
1 (player 2) to encounter outcome 4 (2) sufficiently many times to learn that it is more
attractive than outcome 1, which is already engraved in his mind as a long-term memory.
It is noteworthy that players’ action choices and their understandings of the game
coevolve in our model. Therefore, not only do players benefit from their limited under-
standing of the game, but also because they benefit from such a limited understanding,
their behaviors do not change. Therefore, their views remain partial.16
This result is quite interesting and illuminates the possibility that, because we live
in a very complex society, it might not be feasible for us to learn the true or complete
interactive environment that we face. Our understanding of the environment might be
very limited, but as long as we are satisfied with the outcomes, we do not actively try to
learn the true environment (or do not try and see what will happen if we do something
different from what we normally do). Therefore, our understandings remain limited. Of
course, it is quite possible that because of our limited understanding and the lack of
exploration, we are not receiving a higher payoff, which could be obtainable if we really
understood the complete environment.17
16The dependency of the results on parameter values is discussed in Appendix A, which shows that
the result holds in quite a large parameter space as long as players’ cognition thresholds k are sufficiently
high, i.e., close to their short-term memory length m.
17One might wonder whether 1000 periods is sufficiently long. If we consider a very long simulation,
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3.2. Case of identical short-term memory length but different thresholds
In the previous subsection, we described the case in which players have identical
short-term memory length m and cognition threshold k. When all the players are slow
in constructing their personal view of the game (k close to m), they can obtain a higher
payoff than when they are quick in learning the game structure (small k). What happens
if two players who have the same short-term memory length m1 = m2 = m, but different
cognition thresholds, interact? We consider such cases in this subsection.
Figure 3 presents typical dynamics of long-term memories of two players and the
frequencies of realized outcomes when player 1’s cognitive threshold is 1, k1 = 1, and
that of player 2 is 5, k2 = 5. Both the players have the same short-term memory length,
m = 5. The sensitivity of action choices to attractions, λ, are set equal to 5, and the
payoff matrix is such that a = 0.25.
In this particular simulation run, both players learn outcomes 1 and 5 by period 100.
Although player 2 only learns these two, player 1 learns all the outcomes except for
outcome 9. By period 500, player 1 learns all the outcomes, but player 2’s understanding
remains limited to outcomes 1, 4, and 5.
The dynamics of the frequencies of the realized outcomes are quite interesting. After
the first 100 periods, it was outcome 1 that had been realized the most. Beyond pe-
riod 100, outcomes 4 and 5 are realized with higher frequencies than outcome 1. It is
noteworthy that because player 1 knows almost all the payoffs, when both players are
happily choosing action 1 (therefore outcome 1 is realized), player 1 can infer that if he
chooses action 2 while player 2 continues choosing action 1, he can get a higher payoff
(associated with outcome 4). Therefore, there is a high chance that he will change his
behavior. However, if player 1 indeed chooses action 2, player 2 might think that it is
GL players can learn more about the game because of the probabilistic action choice. Therefore, we can
say even without computer simulation that eventually, in a very long run, the GL players learn the entire
game and behave exactly the same as FP players. This paper presents an investigation of the result of
1000-period computer simulations because our interest is not necessarily in the convergent states but
in the construction of personal view by the players with limited abilities. Of course, how long it takes
for GL players to learn the entire game depends on the model parameters. See Appendix B for more
discussion.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the long-term memory for a player with low k, k1 = 1, (top) and high k, k2 = 5
(middle) and the corresponding frequencies of realized outcomes (bottom) from a single simulation run.
m = 5, λ = 5.0, a = 0.25. The black cells represent the outcomes that are retained as long-term
memories.
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better to choose action 2 instead of action 1. (Recall that player 2 knows the payoff
associated with outcome 5!) Such learning will result in both players indeed choosing
action 2: the Nash equilibrium.
This example shows that even if only one of the players is quick in learning about
the game, two players might learn to choose the actions that correspond to the Nash
equilibrium outcome. It is not necessary that both the players be quick in learning
about the game to reach the Nash equilibrium.
Figure 4 presents the averaged results18 of the simulation runs. It shows, for three
different thresholds (k = 1, 3, 5) of player 1, average payoffs of players over time (top),
average frequencies of realized outcomes (middle), and average status of long-term mem-
ories for two players (bottom). In these simulation runs, player 2’s thresholds are fixed
at k2 = 5. Other parameter values are m1 = m2 = 5, a = 0.25, and λ = 5.0. We are
presenting the k1 = k2 = 5 case as the benchmark.
In the top panel, the average payoff of the player with a lower k, player 1, is the
solid line, whereas that of the player with a high k, player 2, is the dashed line. In the
figure, player 1 receives a higher payoff than player 2 because a player who is quick in
learning about the game, and therefore better understands the game, can make more
sophisticated decisions than the other player.19
However, interestingly, compared with the case in which both players have a very high
cognitive threshold, k1 = k2 = 5, payoffs for both players are lower when one player has a
lower cognitive threshold. As described above, the player with a low cognitive threshold,
player 1, learns almost all the outcomes whereas the player with a high threshold, player
2, learns outcome 1. As player 1 takes action 2, the payoff that player 2 receives from
using action 1 decreases. Consequently, player 2 also learns to take action 2 to get a
18As noted above, for each set of parameter values, we take the average of the results generated by
100 simulation runs, while giving varying random seeds for each run.
19This result is in line with Josephson (2008) who has analyzed evolutionary stability of the class of
action learning models that can be represented by an EWA learning model (Camerer and Ho, 1999). He
found that learning rules that make little use of foregone (hypothetical) payoffs are not evolutionarily
stable, i.e., they can be invaded by other learning rules. In the context of our analysis, foregone payoffs
enter in the learning for those players who know the game. Consequently, players who are faster at
learning about the game have an advantage in competition against slow learners.
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Figure 4: Average payoff of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized outcomes
(middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for three values of k1. m1 = m2 = 5,
k2 = 5, a = 0.25, λ = 5.0. In the top figure, the average payoff of player 1 (low cognitive threshold)
is the solid line, whereas that of player 2 (high cognitive threshold) is the dashed line. For the average
status in the long-term memories, the darker gray corresponds to the higher likelihood that the outcome
is retained as a long-term memory. The same information is also represented by the height of bars.
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higher payoff. Once both the players learn the Nash equilibrium outcome, they do not
deviate from it. However, because the Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated,
the payoffs of both players are lower.
Note also that when one of the players has a low k, the player with a high k also learns
the Nash equilibrium outcome much more often (see the bottom panel of the figure). In
addition, when a is smaller, the payoff difference between the player with a low k and
the player with a high k is larger. See the appendix for more discussion.
4. Account for the Simulation Results
Why can a partial understanding of the game structure benefit players in the focal
game, and why do behaviors of players remain such that their understanding of the
game remains partial? In this section, we provide an explanation through a highly
simplified analysis of the case where players have an identical short-term memory length
and cognition threshold.
In our simulation, the model always seems to reach a state in which probabilities
with which players choose their actions do not vary much over time (at least, if we
take averages over several realizations). Here we restrict our analysis to such a situation.
Because the game in this paper is symmetric and the players have identical characteristics
(i.e., mi, ki, and λi are all the same across players), we specifically examine a symmetric
case. More rigorous and exact analyses are necessary to understand fully the behavior
of the model, but the simplified analysis presented below can explain the main result in
our simulation analysis, namely, why partial understanding of a game can benefit players
and why behaviors of players remain such that their understandings of the game remain
partial.
We start with consideration of learning based only on the realized payoffs (RL model).
The expected level of attraction, Ais, for action s in this case is
Ais = p
i
s
(
pj1pi(a
i
s, a
j
1) + p
j
2pi(a
i
s, a
j
2) + p
j
3pi(a
i
s, a
j
3)
)
, (5)
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where pis and p
j
s are player i’s and j’s probabilities for choosing action s, respectively, as
in eq. (2).
Equation (5) can be obtained is because, in RL model, an action will not receive
the stimulus unless it is actually chosen. When it is chosen, the expected value of the
stimulus that the action receives depends on the probabilities with which the opponent
is choosing the actions. Knowing that pjs =
exp(λAjs)P3
k=1 exp(λA
j
k)
and Ais = A
j
s(≡ ARLs ) for
s ∈ {1, 2, 3} in the symmetric situation, the expected levels of attraction for the RL
model (ARLs ) become
ARL1 = p
RL
1 (p
RL
1 (1− a) + pRL3 ),
ARL2 = p
RL
2 (p
RL
1 + p
RL
2 a+ p
RL
3 a),
ARL3 = p
RL
3 (p
RL
1 + p
RL
3 (1− a)),
where pRLs =
exp(λARLs )P3
k=1 exp(λA
RL
k )
for each action s in the game. Here we have ignored adding
b to the payoffs for clarity of exposition. Solving these equations for ARL1 , A
RL
2 , and A
RL
3
gives us the expected levels of attractions for each action, and the expected probabilities
that players choose each action follows immediately.20
In our model of game learning, players’ understanding of the game plays a role in
determining the expected level of attraction. For example, if the payoff associated with
(si1, s
j
1) is a unique long-term memory in the players’ minds, then the expected attraction
of our model (AGLs ) become
AGL1 = p
GL
1 (1− a) + pGL1 pGL3 ,
AGL2 = p
GL
2 (p
GL
1 + p
GL
2 a+ p
GL
3 a),
AGL3 = p
GL
3 (p
GL
1 + p
GL
3 (1− a)).
These expressions can be obtained because action 1 will elicit a stimulus not only when
20It is possible that multiple solutions exist.
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outcomes (si1, s
j
1), (s
i
1, s
j
2), and (s
i
1, s
j
3) are realized but also every time the opponent
chooses action 1. One can expect from these equations that when players only learn of
the payoffs associated with (si1, s
j
1), action 1 will have a higher expected attraction than
the RL model and will be chosen with a higher probability by players. Consequently,
(si1, s
j
1) will be observed much more frequently in our model than in the case of the RL
model. Furthermore, because players choose other actions with a low probability, other
outcomes are not realized frequently enough. Therefore, their understanding of the game
remains partial.
On the other hand, if players learn the entire game quickly, as in the k = 1 case, the
expected attractions of our model immediately become equivalent to those of learning
based on both realized and forgone payoffs (FP model). The expected attraction for
action s in the FP model is given as
Ais = p
j
1pi(a
i
s, a
j
1) + p
j
2pi(a
i
s, a
j
2) + p
j
3pi(a
i
s, a
j
3). (6)
Equation (6) can be derived because all the actions will always receive stimulus, irre-
spective of whether they have been chosen or not. Therefore, the expected levels of
attractions in the FP model (AFPs ) become
AFP1 = p
FP
1 (1− a) + pFP3 ,
AFP2 = p
FP
1 + p
FP
2 a+ p
FP
3 a,
AFP3 = p
FP
1 + p
FP
3 (1− a),
for the game when we ignore the b added to the payoffs. These expressions give the
largest weight to choosing action 2 for both of the players. Therefore, compared with
the RL model, the FP model results in players obtaining lower payoffs.
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5. Summary and Conclusion
This paper presented a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little
knowledge about the game they play. They gain experience through playing the game
repeatedly. Based on their experience, they not only learn which action will bring about
a higher payoff but also form their view about the game they are playing. We show that,
in the 3 × 3 game we have considered, which embeds both a prisoner’s dilemma and a
coordination game, players might benefit from having a very limited understanding of
the game when all the players have such a limited understanding. Their payoffs can be
higher than in the cases where players have full or no understanding of the game. It is
noteworthy that personal views and behaviors of players coevolve in our model. Players
enjoy a high payoff. Therefore, their understanding of the game remains partial and vice
versa. This result suggests that players might live happily without fully understanding
highly complex strategic environments.
When one player has a much better understanding of the game than the other player,
the one with the better understanding can enjoy a higher payoff than the player with
less understanding. However, their payoffs—even the payoffs of the player who better
understands the game—can be lower than in the case in which all the players have a
limited understanding. The behavior of the player who better understands the game can
lead the other player to respond in a way that lowers their payoffs. This, combined with
the results above, suggests that a benefit of ignorance might exist, but it exists only when
everyone is ignorant.
Our paper has been motivated the recent development of a new theory, inductive
game theory, by Kaneko and Kline (2007, 2008).21 Inductive game theory investigates
experiential foundations of beliefs/knowledge with players memories. Akiyama et al.
(2008) represents two types of memories, short-term and long-term memories, based
on informal theory in Kaneko and Kline (2008), and show boundary of learning within
practical finite time. On the other hand, this paper concentrates on explicit analysis of
21See §9.3 in Kaneko and Kline (2008) for details.
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learning dynamics when giving a probabilistic behavior model with the same types of
memories in Akiyama et al. (2008). In contrast with Akiyama et al. (2008), this paper
considers the relationship between players cognitive abilities and average payoffs in
a two-person game. As a result, we found that the interaction between players with
different cognitive abilities has an influence of each player s average payoff, as described
above.
As described herein, we have considered a pair of players playing the game repeatedly.
However, one can easily extend the framework presented here to the case where there are
many players to be matched with a few others. In such a case, it is possible to consider
various matching protocols: for example, players might be situated in a network and
interact only locally. The results here suggest that it is possible that players form several
different “local views” of the same objective game. What will happen when occasional
random matching exists among those with different views? Are there views that can
spread much more easily than others? These are all interesting questions to investigate,
but we will leave them for future research.
It is also interesting to conduct laboratory experiments and examine how subjects
learn in the situation considered in this paper; namely, subjects are initially only informed
about the set of actions available to themselves, but they observe actions chosen by all
the relevant players and the payoff received after each interaction. Do subjects behave
in the way that the model predicts? We leave these questions also for future research.
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A. Dependency of the Results on Parameter Values
In the main text, we presented results under m1 = m2 = 5, a = 0.25, λ = 5.0. Here
we show what happens to the results if we change the parameter values.
Figures 5 and 6 show results for the case in which a = 0.05 and a = 0.45, respectively,
in the same format as Fig. 2. As in the case discussed in the main text, when k = 1,
GL players quickly learn all the outcomes, and their behaviors converge to that of FP
players. When a = 0.45, there is not much difference in behavior among the GL, FP, and
RL players. It is also the case in which among GL players, the differences in cognition
threshold k do not affect their behavior markedly. In all the models, players learn to play
the Nash equilibrium. Then they learn the payoff associated with the Nash equilibrium
outcome almost all the time.
In these two figures, the GL players do not receive higher payoffs than FP or RL
players, contrary to the description in the main text and Fig. 2. What is the range of
a over which our main result holds? How about the range of λ? Figure 7 presents the
average payoff of players for various values of a holding λ constant at λ = 5.0 (top)
as well as various values of λ while holding a constant at a = 0.25. The GL players
receive higher payoffs than FP and RL players over quite a large parameter space: in
particular, 0.1 ≤ a ≤ 0.35 when λ = 5.0 and 3.0 ≤ λ ≤ 6.0 for a = 0.25. In fact, we have
experimented with other values of m, and have obtained similar results: as k becomes
closer to m, the GL players receive high payoffs while their understanding of the game
remains very limited, although the specific values of a and λ for which such a result holds
depend on m.
When players have the same short-term memory length but different cognition thresh-
olds, the player with a low cognition threshold (the one who learns the game quickly)
receives a higher payoff than the one with a high cognition threshold. The difference
between the payoffs received by the two players is larger when the difference between the
two thresholds is large and also when a is low.
Figure 8 presents results for simulation runs when m1 = m2 = 5, λ = 5.0 and
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Figure 5: Average payoff of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized outcomes
(middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for various k. m = 5, a = 0.05, λ = 5.0.
For the average payoff, the result of our model is in solid black, the solid gray represents the RL model,
and the dashed gray represents the FP model. For the average status in the long-term memory, the
darker gray corresponds to the higher likelihood that the outcome is retained as a long-term memory,
which is also represented by the height of bars.
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Figure 6: Average payoff of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized outcomes
(middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for various k. m = 5, a = 0.45, and
λ = 5.0. For the average payoff, the result of our model is shown in solid black. Solid gray represents the
RL model; the dashed gray represents the FP model. For the average status of long-term memories, the
darker gray corresponds to the higher likelihood that the outcome is retained as a long-term memory.
The same information is also represented by the height of bars.
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Figure 7: Average payoff of the row-player over time for various a (top) and for various values of λ
(bottom). m = 5, k = 5, λ = 5.0 (top) and a = 0.25 (bottom). For the average payoff, the result of our
model is presented in solid black. The solid gray represents RL model. The dashed gray represents the
FP model.
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Figure 8: Average payoff of the row-player over time (top), average frequencies of realized outcomes
(middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom) for three values of k1. m1 = m2 = 5,
k2 = 5, a = 0.05, λ = 5.0. In the top panel, the average payoff of player 1 (low cognitive threshold) is
shown as a solid line, whereas that of player 2 (high cognitive threshold) is shown as the dashed line.
For the average status of the long-term memories, the darker gray corresponds to the higher likelihood
that the outcome is recorded as a long-term memory. The same information is also represented by the
height of bars.
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a = 0.05. As might be readily apparent, the lower k1 is, the greater the payoff difference
between the two players. Furthermore, compared with what was shown in Fig. 4, the
payoff differences between the two players are larger here.
B. Longer Run Results
The results presented in the main text were based on the first 1000 periods of simula-
tion because our interest is not necessarily in the convergent states but in the construction
of personal view by the players with limited abilities. It is noteworthy that because of
the construction of the model, in particular the probabilistic action choices, the longer
the simulation is, the better players learn about the game. In fact, if the game was going
to be repeated infinitely many times, then GL players would eventually learn all the
payoffs, and their behaviors would become equivalent to those of FP players.
In a finite time horizon, however, how much GL players can learn about the game
depends on their short-term memory length, m, and cognition threshold, k, as well as
other parameters of the model. To illustrate this point, the average payoffs obtained by
GL players (black), RL players (solid gray), and FP players (dashed gray) over 50 000
periods are portrayed in Fig. 9. In the figure, results for GL players of two types are
described, m = k = 5 (left) and m = k = 10 (right).22 Here two players with the same
short-term memory length and cognition thresholds are matched. Other parameters are
the same as in Fig. 2. As shown in the figure, a declining trend exists, in the long run,
for the average payoff of GL players in case of m = k = 5. On the contrary, we cannot
observe such an explicit trend in the case of m = k = 10. The difference between these
two results arises from the ease with which players learn about the payoffs. The higher
the cognition threshold, the more difficult it is for players to learn. Consequently, it takes
much longer for their behaviors (therefore, payoffs) to converge to those of FP players.
22Just as in all the simulations presented in this paper, FP players and RL players have the same
short-term memory length as GL players.
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Average Payoff of Players Over Time
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Figure 9: Average payoff of the row-player over time. Both players having m = k = 5 (left) and
m = k = 10 (right). a = 0.25, λ = 5.0. The GL model is shown in solid black. The solid gray represents
the RL model. The dashed gray represents the FP model. The payoffs are averaged over 100 simulation
runs.
C. Results from 2× 2 games
In the main text, we presented results from 3× 3 games that embed both prisoner’s
dilemma and coordination games. We have specifically examined such games because we
were interested in studying what kind of personal views emerge from our model. Our
model, however, is applicable to simpler 2×2 games as well. In this appendix, we show the
results from applying GL model as well as RL and FP models to the prisoner’s dilemma
game and coordination game separately. The results discussed here show that in both
the prisoner’s dilemma game and coordination game with risk-payoff tradeoff, we obtain
similar outcomes in terms of the average payoffs in the first 1000 periods. That is, GL
players with a high cognition threshold might benefit from their limited understanding
of the game, and might obtain higher payoffs than those players with no understanding
of the game (RL players) or full understanding of the game (FP players).
In this section, we assume that two players with the same short-term memory length,
m = 5, and cognition threshold, k, are matched to play the game. We consider three
cognition thresholds k ∈ {1, 3, 5}. We have also set the sensitivity of action choices to
the attraction, λ = 5.0, as in most of the simulations reported in the main text.
Figure 10 presents results of our simulation for a prisoner’s dilemma game with a =
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0.25. The average payoffs demonstrate similar results to those obtained in the 3 × 3
game. Namely, GL players with a high cognition threshold, k = 5, obtain higher average
payoffs than both RL and FP players. In addition, as before, RL players obtain higher
payoff than FP players. The GL players with lower cognition thresholds learn about the
game relatively quickly and their behaviors converge to those of FP players. The average
status of long-term memories shows somewhat different results from the 3 × 3 games.
(Four outcomes that correspond to prisoner’s dilemma are 1, 2, 4, 5 in Fig. 2.) Namely,
the frequency for outcome 1 (efficient outcome) being retained as a long-term memory is
lower, and that for outcome 4 (outcome 5 in the case of 3 × 3 game) is higher than the
case considered in main text.
Figure 11 presents results for a coordination game with a = 0.35. We have chosen
a = 0.35 for this game instead of a = 0.25 because the risk–payoff tradeoff takes place
only for 1/3 < a < 0.5.23 For this game, the average payoffs demonstrate similar results
as in the 3 × 3 game. Namely, GL players with high cognition threshold, k = 5, obtain
higher average payoffs than both RL and FP players. The RL model results in a payoff-
dominant equilibrium (lower right outcome, outcome 4) more frequently than the risk-
dominant equilibrium (upper left outcome, outcome 1), whereas it is opposite in the case
of FP model. The GL model, when the cognition threshold is high, results in the payoff
dominant equilibrium more frequently than the RL model.
23For a = 0.25, the lower right outcome is realized most frequently in all the models described in this
paper.
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Average Payoff of the Row-Player Over Time
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Figure 10: A result from the prisoner’s dilemma game a = 0.25. The average payoff of the row-player over
time (top), average frequencies of realized outcomes (middle), and average status of long-term memories
(bottom) for various k. m = 5, λ = 5.0. For the average payoff, the result of our model is presented in
solid black. The solid gray represents the RL model. The dashed gray represents the FP model. For
the average status of long-term memories, the darker gray corresponds to the higher likelihood that the
outcome is retained as a long-term memory, which is also represented by the height of bars.
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Figure 11: A result from coordination game a = 0.35. Average payoff of the row-player over time (top),
average frequencies of realized outcomes (middle), and average status of long-term memories (bottom)
for various k. m = 5, λ = 5.0. For the average payoff, the result of our model is in solid black, the solid
gray represents the RL model, and the dashed gray represents the FP model. For the average status of
long-term memories, the darker gray corresponds to the higher likelihood that the outcome is retained
as a long-term memory, which is also represented by the height of bars.
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